The Macro Method to the MicroMadness in Syria

First of all, let me say that, in my opinion, anyone who is instantaneously and continuously giving analysis of an ongoing and developing situation, very likely is not giving analysis at all, but propaganda and narrative. They are interested in trying to ensure that a particular interpretation of events prevails. OK, that is not analysis. In order to analyze, you need real information, and in certain situations, real information is difficult if not impossible to come by. This is particularly the case in an active conflict zone.

I think it is very important sometimes to wait before you open your mouth about something, or at least to not react to every headline or incident or event that takes place and extrapolate from that singular incident or event all sorts of hypotheses about what is happening or what is going to happen. This is just a general rule, and I try to adhere to it. If you don’t do that, it would be like a weather forecaster telling you that we are in the beginning of a new ice age because it happens to be snowing at that moment. You know? If the snow continues at this pace, the whole world will be buried within 6 months. That is obviously not analysis, but that kind of thing can spread very quickly and then it just becomes harder and harder to locate in the noise what is true and what matters. It is like trying to listen to a single instrument in a symphony orchestra when everyone is playing at the same time. I am trying to hear the fife but I’ve got three tubas and a kettle drum in my ear.

And then the other thing, similarly, is that you should not talk about a topic just because people want you to talk about it, if you aren’t actually qualified to talk about it.

I have always tried in my life, and on this channel, to only discuss things I can discuss confidently and with reasonable certainty. I can only discuss anything with confidence and reasonable certainty if I have valid information and knowledge about it. If I don’t have that, I generally will not discuss it.

Many people have requested that I talk about a number of things I am not comfortable talking about, simply because I don’t know enough about them. I think people get used to everyone having an opinion on everything, especially online, and a lot of channels just want to produce content, so they will talk about anything that is currently in the headlines, because they know it will get views, because it is trending. I think that is irresponsible, and just adds to the confusion.

Now, as for the situation in Syria, I have generally avoided talking about it, from 2011 until now; because I think the whole situation is incredibly unclear. Back in the mid 2010s, I was involved in proposing strategies of resistance in Egypt after the takeover of the government by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi; and exploring tactics of system disruption targeting the interests of neoliberal Western predatory investors. At that time, many people wanted my input on the Syrian war, but I honestly did not see anything useful that could be done, certainly nothing useful that I could contribute to the situation. I have not trusted anything happening in Syria since the economic reform protests rather abruptly turned into armed militias demanding the overthrow of the government, particularly since I knew that the US had been trying to stir an uprising in Syria for years. In my opinion, everyone is lying in Syria and about Syria, and they have been for 14 years. Everything about the situation is a lie except for the destruction; that’s the only thing that is not ambiguous.

So, when I do look at the situation in Syria, the situation right now, with the HTS advances in Aleppo and Hama, and the apparent collapse of any discipline or commitment by the Syrian army; I am not following, or closely monitoring the hourly updates coming in. To me that is mostly noise. In my opinion, all of the domestic players are like boats with no motors, no rudders, no oars and no sails; having a race; when all of them are just being moved by the currents of the sea they’re in. None of them are moving themselves. Not the government and not the rebels. So, watch the water not the boats.

In other words, for a situation like Syria, I have to look at the macro dynamics to make sense of the micro dynamics, not the other way around. And the macro dynamics, to make it simple, are that the GCC, BRICS, and the anational OCGFC are interested in the region stabilizing, prospering, and the Gulf states have a vision to extend their sphere of influence across the coast of Mediterranean from Egypt to Turkey. The primary necessities for achieving this are the end of the Palestinian conflict and the elimination of militant groups; but it also requires ending the conflict in Syria — by one way or another. Pursuing the achievement of these necessities can include a variety of strategies that will have to be adaptable and flexible, depending on circumstances and conditions.

I think that the Gulf has long felt that regional stability overall requires the isolation of Iran and a thorough reduction of Iran’s influence. They want Iranian interference in Lebanon and Syria to end. Part of that is because Iranian interference in those countries is inherently destabilizing, and part of it is because they do not want to compete with Iran for influence in the region. By Iran joining BRICS, restoring ties with Saudi Arabia, and so on; they can get Iran to cooperate in voluntarily abandoning, withdrawing from, or otherwise neutralizing their own proxy militias, to prove that they are team players. But, I do not believe that the Gulf countries will be satisfied with having Iran, under the current regime, continue operating outside its borders in any significant way. They don’t just want their militias gone, they want Iran to recede entirely. Iran has only really invested in militias as their main strategy for gaining influence, so if they go along with abandoning armed proxies, they will have to play catch up in terms of gaining influence through soft power and money, and it is unlikely that they could compete with the cash and influence of the Gulf. Now, giving up the militias is something they really are going to have to do, and I think they are doing; simply because if they don’t, they risk being targeted seriously for regime change. Truth be told, I think everyone who matters is ultimately going to work for regime change in Iran anyway, because the regime just has too much baggage and its orientation generally does not lend itself to cooperation and integration.

So, ok, this is sort of the context, and all of this being the case, Syria is up for grabs. Iranian influence in Syria has to recede, and the Gulf wants to acquire Syria into their sphere of influence, but that trespasses Turkey’s sphere of influence, so there is tension over that, and I think Turkey wants to assert their dominion. I believe that the Gulf and Turkey have some degree of understanding about the regional vision, and they are willing to cooperate with each other, but there is a long-standing history of rivalry over leadership between the Gulf and Turkey, and Turkey doesn’t want to be taken advantage of or under-estimated; they want to preserve the territorial integrity of their historical regional power. And Syria is within that virtual territory, particularly if Iran is sidelined. It makes more sense to the Turks that Syria would be their vassal state, not Saudi Arabia’s or what have you. So, I think Turkey is willing to cooperate, but they are not willing to cede space that they believe for a variety of reasons belongs within their dominion of influence.

So, what about the rebel groups, the resistance, or whatever you want to call the various externally backed armed factions in Syria? Where does that leave Bashar al-Assad? Well, you have to understand, any non-state armed group is only ever — their function is only ever to improve the negotiating position of whoever is backing them. They don’t take over. They are just an element, just a kind of leverage, that will bolster their bosses when the conflict they are perpetuating inevitably gets resolved through negotiations. That is the only political function of non-state armed groups. Anyone who thinks this or that armed group is going to take over this or that country, you are fooling yourself. Even if some figure from such a group gets installed as a ruler, he won’t be the ruler, the ones who backed the group all along will be the ruler. The pieces on a chessboard do not decide the gambit, and that is all these groups are: pieces on the board.

So what about Assad? Well, the whole Syrian civil war illustrated that the GCC wanted to remove him from power, and I don’t think there is any reason to believe they feel any differently now. If someone has already shown their hand by being aggressively hostile, you should know that if they take a different approach to you later on, they are still seeking the same thing they were seeking when they were being aggressive. They just learned new methods.

Assad’s position is not really any different than any other player in Syria, in other words, what will happen to him depends on decisions and or agreements made between external players. And, of course, the relationship between the external players, the external decision-makers, has changed considerably since the war began. So, a consensus might be, or might have already been, determined, that Assad is no longer viable. That Assad remaining interferes with the overall regional plan. This is what I mean about the flexibility and adaptability of strategies. None of the elements are stable; in other words, none of the pawns are secure, any of them can be sacrificed, and whether they are sacrificed or not will only have to do with the circumstances. As circumstances change, the fate of the pawn changes.

So yes, potentially Bashar will be let go, and HTS or whoever else will take Damascus; but the battle in Syria is only between the external players jockeying for control and influence over Syria; regardless of what is happening at the moment, it still remains to be seen how it will all play out; but what appears to me to be the objective is, as I said, an end of conflict and militancy, containment of Iranian influence, and then just determining the balance of power and influence between the Gulf and Turkey. It is actually still possible that Bashar can save himself, if he genuflects to Erdogan; but I don’t think the Khaleej want him there at all.

See, there are so many ways that it can play out, there is just no point predicting, except to just understand the ultimate objective regionally. If you know that, then you can better understand the motives, and the options available to all the players. There are ways it can play out that would be very smooth and organized, but there are actions that some of the players could take that would make it very messy; but I think even the messy options would only be temporary obstacles. The anational OCGFC and the Gulf, appear to be proceeding full pace with regional stabilization.

Now, in my personal opinion, Assad should go, and I completely agree with the containment and isolation of Iran as a practical necessity — and I think Iran actually understands this too. Turkey has considerable leverage, and has every right to secure their interests. The only real danger is for the historical tension and rivalry for leadership between the Gulf and Turkey to spoil things. In my view, the Gulf should bankroll and Turkey should lead, and they should operate as equal partners in the establishment and development of this soft empire being put together in the region.

I know a lot of people get mad about the idea of their countries being dominated by other countries; like by the Gulf or by Turkey; because they want national sovereignty, and independence and so forth. But the real world does not function like that. And, historically, this has been the model of Islamic territorial empire: limited autonomy within a province, with loosely centralized control from the capital; so it is very much the same. Palestine/ Israel will be subordinate, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, will be subordinate; Egypt, Sudan, and so on; all will be subordinate, but that subordination will not be tyrannical and exploitative, in my opinion. Each will have a role, each will prosper and develop in the long term; and there will be collective sovereignty.

I think everyone would like to see a different regime in Iran, and that is probably inevitable, but I also don’t think anyone wants that to be accomplished through war and violence. The regime in Iran has been a beneficiary of strife and conflict in the region, and they have a symbiotic relationship with Israel, and have not had a vested interest in stability. They have tried and are trying to demonstrate that they can change, that they can be a team player, but I don’t think it is going to work. The regime’s instincts are unlikely to change. Frankly, and I know the official narrative makes this sound bizarre, but it is true: If the Palestinian conflict is resolved, the regime in Iran is on borrowed time. They actually need Israel in order to survive, at least in their current form; so either the regime in Iran will fall, or change to such an extent that they will have fallen by other means. In other words, they have to become drastically different than they have been; and I am doubtful that they can do it.

But, at the end of the day, everything we are seeing all point to the achievement of the regional vision I have been talking about. And it is quite remarkable. The level of commitment to transforming the region, the pragmatism, the real politik, the assertion of collective sovereignty and leadership to take charge over the affairs of the region, is truly impressive and, even though we are going through tremendous upheaval and turmoil, I think there is every reason for optimism. All of the radical, fanatic, extremist elements in the region — which have always been sponsored by, backed by, and largely created and implanted in the region by the West, are being dismantled; and it is gradually returning to its natural state.

As I have said many times, we need to look at current events as if in retrospect from the position of the inevitable point of victory. From that perspective, I think that what is happening now in Syria can be seen as a significant step to the gradual establishment of regional cohesion and cooperation. Even if Bashar remains, or even if he is removed; Syria appears to be increasingly under the influence of players that can secure its stability, as opposed to Western influence, Iranian influence, and extremist elements. Personally, I see things coming together, even if the exact path things are taking cannot be fully discerned in terms of whatever obstacles, twists and turns, there may be; I think the direction is clear. And al-Hamdulillah, I think it is a positive direction.

The more Western and American influence withdraws — and I include Iranian influence as Western influence, insofar as it typically serves the same goals as Western influence, ie, instability and division — as these negative influences withdraw, insha’Allah we will see the region go from strength to strength. This is also one of the reasons I have not rushed to talk about Syria, because, as I see it, things are simply following the overall trajectory of the regional plan. It was not implausible at the beginning of the rebel offensive that it was going to just be a gambit to then decimate the rebels in a counter-offensive, which would have been an alternative approach to stabilizing the situation; but as things stand now, it does appear that either Assad will be removed, or else, he will be subjugated and subordinated more securely by weakening his regime and reducing his ability to act independently. My only real concern and my hope, is that we will not see Syria partitioned in any way, I don’t think that would be a positive measure. And I think they will try to avoid that. Either way, I think it is important, again, to remember that the rebel groups, no matter who they are, are not the ones who are going to determine the ultimate outcome, the ultimate outcome is being determined by the external players partially by means of the rebels. Turkey, the GCC, Iran, and the anational OCGFC are the waters that are moving the boats in Syria, and they are the main ones, not America or Israel, in my opinion; they are involved to one degree or another, but with very diminished power. Control is being taken back over the region by the region itself, and I think five or ten years from now, insha’Allah bi idhnillah, we will see a more stable and thriving Middle East than any of us have seen in our lifetimes.