The complex interests in Sudan

My last video update on the situation in Sudan feels like it might have been a little bit confusing. That is partially because the situation is complicated and confusing, and because I rushed to make it. So, let me try to present my thoughts more coherently here.

First of all, there are two concepts that you have to keep in mind in this situation, and frankly in all geopolitical strategy scenarios: Leverage, and bet-hedging. The first concept relates to the influence a country has with another country because of the value of their relationship; and the second concept relates to how countries deal with each other when their relationship is ambiguous.

Both of these concepts play a huge role in the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s relationships with the US, with Russia, with China, with Egypt, and of course, with Sudan.

The next thing you have to keep in mind is an accepted truism of geopolitics, which is that there are no friends or enemies, there are only interests, and these interests determine who is a friend or an enemy, and these are not static states. A friend today can be an enemy tomorrow, and a friend again the day after that, depending upon what interests are involved.

The United States has had a long relationship with the Saudis and the Emiratis, they have been loyal clients of the US for decades, and have been duly rewarded for that. For reasons that should go without saying, both countries are extremely valuable regional allies of the United States.

The US has trusted both countries with enough latitude to pursue an expansion of their sphere of influence in the region, with the implicit understanding, that they would essentially be managing the Gulf and East Africa on behalf of the US, or anyway, in a way that would protect American interests. KSA and the UAE have not wasted this opportunity, and have been aggressively expanding their presence and influence across the region. This has been acceptable to the United States because they are increasingly interested in scaling back their own direct policing of the region.

However, over the past few years, and particularly since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, ambiguity has crept into their relationship. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have actively pursued stronger and deeper ties with Russia and China, and have, as we all know, been conducting their statecraft with increasing independence. Nevertheless, they have simultaneously demonstrated sufficient regard and respect for American interests, that the US has not categorised them as a lost asset, and the relationship remains valuable to them.

Now, because of their growing regional influence, both Russia and China have also identified the UAE and Saudi Arabia as important allies, since they are tremendously interested in growing their presence in the Middle East and Africa. So, they naturally want to partner with the most influential player in the region who is not America, since America does not want them in the region. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, then, are presenting themselves to the US, China, and Russia, as a sort of broker, who can balance everyone’s interests. Neither the US, Russia, or China, can demand that the UAE and Saudi Arabia cut ties with any of them, because the relationship is too important to all of them to risk alienating the Emiratis or the Saudis, who could potentially scupper their interests in the region. And all of them will be inclined to see Saudi and Emirati influence and control strengthen, because that theoretically makes all of their interests — which the UAE and KSA are managing — more secure.

So, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have leverage because of the influence they have built in the Middle East and Africa, and by that leverage, they are not only making Russia, China, and the US tolerate each other’s presence in the region, they are making them support the Saudi and Emirati mission to strengthen their influence — because it is in everyone’s interest.

This brings us to Sudan. Given what I have just explained, what do you think the US, China, and Russia would rather see happen in Sudan; a transition to a democratically-elected civilian government, or the installation of a president who is under the management of the UAE and Saudi Arabia? Of course, they want Sudan under tighter control by their management brokers; and obviously, the UAE and Saudi Arabia want that too. Nobody wants democracy in Sudan, that could potentially ruin everything.

So, I believe that the UAE and Saudi Arabia proposed a solution: have the RSF overthrow the regime. They know they are experienced and dangerous fighters, they know that they are loyal, and they know that the RSF leadership stands to gain enormously if they succeed. This is probably why the RSF has been primarily responsible for blocking the transition to a civilian government, by rejecting the regime’s plan to integrate them into the Sudanese Army; because the UAE and KSA wanted to hobble the transition process as long as possible, until they finally opted for the idea of supporting a coup d’etat.

As the designated broker in Sudan for all international parties concerned, the UAE and Saudia would have explained this project to Russia, China, the Americans, the Brits, and as we know, the Norwegians. They could have presented this in any number of ways, depending upon what each side wanted to hear; and they no doubt, assured them all that the coup would proceed quickly and without a hitch.

To the Russians and Chinese, they would have likely said that, in case things go sideways, they might need support. Wagner is extremely active in Africa, and could potentially be deployed to assist the RSF, either with their own personnel, or other mercenaries connected with them. To the Americans and Europeans, they would likely not have broached the possibility that things could go sideways, except to sell them on the idea that the RSF is committed to democracy and fighting radical Islamism, and the West should incline towards their cause at least by not showing support for the government if the coup gets messier than expected. And you can take note of the fact that no one in the West has condemned the coup, nor expressed solidarity with the regime; which is conspicuous and unusual in these circumstances.

Now, when this proposal comes to the US, because KSA and the UAE have leverage, they will accept it; but because ambiguity and suspicion has crept into their relationship, they will hedge their bets. The US has very little to lose if Sudan falls into chaos in the wake of a failed coup, such a situation would achieve their objective of disrupting Russian and Chinese interests in Sudan — so a failed coup and chaos are fine with them. But if a coup is successful, they will want to have been on the team that got the new government in power, they will want to have been on the team of the UAE and Saudi Arabia; to ensure that their interests are not sidelined by China and Russia. In other words, it is win-win for them. If the coup succeeds, they maintain influence via the UAE and Saudia, and if it fails, they may lose their own interests or potential interests, but China and Russia lose theirs too. And so, the US would reserve the strategic option to push Sudan into civil war if the coup gets complicated. Wreaking havoc is something the US can do with minimal investment. So, they agreed to bet on the coup, but hedged their bet with the option to destroy Sudan. That option likely includes, supporting the regime against RSF if RSF cannot seal the deal, and starts getting Russian and Chinese support. So, then Sudan becomes a proxy war between the US and Russia and China.

What the UAE and Saudi Arabia will do if the coup fails is unclear; they have a lot at stake, and they have both proven in the past, both with Yemen and with the boycott of Qatar, that they have a penchant for not knowing when to give up when they are trying to consolidate their influence. So, if they did not learn their lesson yet, they may well continue to support the RSF. If they learned their lesson, they would cut RSF loose if they appear unable to complete the coup, and they will throw their backing to the Burhan regime, and help annihilate the RSF.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have typically done much better with soft power approaches to growing their influence than with boldly aggressive moves. I think they have attempted a hostile takeover of Sudan, and it has not gone to plan, if they persist much longer with the attempt, the US will activate their hedge, and Sudan will collapse into full blown civil war, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE will sabotage their own mission of expanding their influence.

I think they were either misled, or misled themselves by their own ambition, into thinking that the RSF was more organised and capable than they are.

It is also worth considering that both China and Russia may have also doubted the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s plan, and that they could also opt to switch sides when they see which way the wind is blowing, and begin supporting the regime against the RSF. If that happens, the UAE and Saudi Arabia would become redundant to every international player with interest in Sudan, as a result of their own incompetence in this adventure.

This would not mean the end of the Saudi and Emirati project to grow their influence, but it would be a major blow to its progress, if they do not choose their next moves very wisely.

Now, the victims in all this, of course, are the people of Sudan, who are being denied any say in how their country is governed and by whom. But, again, this is simply the nature of geopolitics; if you are a weak state, you will inevitably be dominated by stronger ones. I am still of the opinion that being dominated by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and by extension, Russia and China, would be preferrable to being dominated by the United States. It is just tragic that these are the choices for Sudan at this moment in history, and we pray for the safety of all our brothers and sisters there, who just want to live their lives peacefully .