Islamic Realpolitik
It should be fairly obvious by now to anyone who watches my channel regularly that I approach politics and global affairs from a realpolitik perspective. Which is to say, a practical, realistic, objective reading of what is going on, and how Muslims should navigate these real-world circumstances; without ideological blinders.
Realpolitik has gotten a bit of a bad name because it is understood to be an amoral approach to politics, removed from ideology or ethics — basically an ends justifies the means mentality. This is more or less the official definition of realpolitik, and it is the way most practitioners do it. But, of course, any time you want to achieve a particular goal, that goal is based on an ideologically-determined system for prioritization. Meaning, you cannot remove a belief system from what determines what you want to achieve. Specific outcomes are sought because your belief system views those outcomes as good. So, for example, when realpolitik practitioners prioritize, say, control over markets, security, economic growth, or what have you; it is because those practitioners’ ideology regards those things as being of the greatest importance. So, it is not really true that there is no ideology involved here; we have just tended to see amoral ideologies engaging in realpolitik.
In my opinion, you can utilize the realpolitik approach for pursuing moral outcomes; in fact, I think if you are serious about achieving moral outcomes, you must take a realpolitik approach to strategy; and I do not believe that this conflicts with Islam whatsoever; quite the contrary. From the earliest period, the Muslims balanced ideals against pragmatism, seeking ideal outcomes through pragmatic means.
I believe the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was an example of Rasulullah taking a realpolitik approach, while the emotional reaction of Umar to the treaty was a purely idealistic. We are not aware of the Prophet receiving revelation about the treaty until after he had signed it, meaning, his decision to agree to it was not a matter ordered by Allah, but subsequently heralded by Allah through wahy as a victory. Meaning, Rasulullah evaluated the situation rationally, and gauged the potential benefits of entering the treaty, and made his decision on that basis; believing that the sulh was the most practical strategy for pursuing the moral goal of spreading Islam further, and easing the difficulties of the Muslims. When the Ahzaab were besieging Madinah at Khandaq, Rasulullah suggested offering a deal to some of the tribes, including granting them a share of the Muslims’ crops, in exchange for them severing their alliance with Quraysh — that was a pragmatic, realpolitik strategy aimed at relieving the Muslims of the peril they were facing. When the Sahabah asked him whether or not this resolution was given to him by Allah, or whether it was his own idea, and he said it was his own idea, they expressed their dislike for the compromise. Ultimately, of course, a different realpolitik strategy was employed to dismantle the siege, basically using what we would now characterise as espionage, or a psy-op, against the tribes to cause them to disband the Ahzaab.
You can look at the careful investigations Rasulullah made around the caravan of the Quraysh before embarking on the Battle of Badr, as well, as him taking a realpolitik approach to decision-making. He wanted to have as much objective information as possible about the caravan before deciding to engage; and again, the correctness of his decision was only later confirmed by wahy assuring him of victory.
You can even look at his handling of Banu Quraydhah to see the realpolitik approach he took in the absence of revelation. It is even more interesting because Rasulullah had been ordered to deal with them, but not instructed on specifically how to deal with them, and his appointment of Sa’d ibn Mu’adh to decide their fate was a remarkable stroke of political savvy, reconciling both Banu Quraydhah and the Aws tribe with the ultimate judgment of Sa’d. It is also claimed, of course, that Sa’d’s judgement derived from the Torah, which there is no reason to suppose it was, but it certainly aligned with it — even according to modern rabbinical scholars — which left the Banu Quraydhah with even less of a grounds to object. The whole episode demonstrates the brilliance of Rasulullah’s tactical political acumen.
In all three of the instances I mentioned, we see Rasulullah accepting or offering to accept, a temporary concession, or compromise, or even what might appear to be the surrendering of an authoritative principle — with the treaty of Hudaybiyyah, Rasulullah allowed the document to not refer to him as Rasulullah, but as simply Muhammad, he allowed for the return of Muslims back to Makkah who had fled to Madinah, and so on; at Khandaq, he basically offered to sacrifice Muslim crops as a pay-off to the Ahzab; and at Banu Quraydhah, he allowed someone else to render the judgment, when every Muslim knows all judgements are to be referred to Allah and His Messenger. But these apparent concessions, these apparent compromises, were pragmatic, realpolitik manoeuvres in which ideology (for lack of a better term) directed what outcomes were sought, but not the strategy on how to achieve them. The strategy for achieving a moral or ideological outcome was left to be determined through a political, military, or economic assessment of what was the most effective, given the prevailing circumstances.
I think you can certainly read the story of Al-Khidr and also see realpolitik at work. Al-Khidr did many things which at first appraisal were highly questionable, if not immoral; but his actions were decisive measures to address issues about which Allah had made him aware. An uncharitable interpretation of the story of Al-Khidr would see it as approving the idea of the ends justifying the means; but I would argue that it simply represents taking a realistic and un-idealistic approach to solving problems, confronting dangers, and supporting the common good through objective evaluation and decisive action.
There is an old moral teaching about a man passing by a river and suddenly seeing a baby floating past about to drown. He runs into the river to save the baby, but then sees another, and another, and another; an endless number of babies floating down the river all about to drown. Another man appears on the shore and the man in the river cries out to him to help. The man on the shore pauses for a moment, and then starts to walk away. The man in the river shouts at him, “where are you going, you have to help me save these babies!” The man replies, “That is what I am doing, I am going to find where the babies are being placed in the river, and stop it”. Who was right? The man in the river will certainly be able to save a few babies, but will just as certainly fail to save many. The man on the shore will certainly be able to save many babies, but will just as certainly fail to save a few, and he will bring the problem to a conclusive end. The man in the river represents the moral idealist or ideological approach, while the man on the shore represents the realpolitik approach of achieving moral ends through objective and unemotional strategy. But, of course, the man on the shore is also guilty of literally walking away from drowning babies whom he could save at that moment if he tried. There is no getting around that fact, but in my opinion, his approach is still superior.
I think we can frame this approach as the moral decision-making equivalent of the decision-making approach of delayed gratification. It is similar to how you choose to sacrifice some form of immediate gratification today, for a greater gratification in the future. It is more pleasant to sit on your couch than to go to the gym, and going to the gym will not provide you immediate results. But if you go to the gym instead of sitting on your couch, eventually, the outcome is going to be far better for you than the immediate enjoyment of lazy indulgence. That is delayed-gratification. Realpolitik is something like this. You may have to do things that are distasteful in the immediate term, things that even contradict your values perhaps, but they are necessary if you want to achieve long-term moral outcomes. This is a very hard pill for most people to swallow, and it is not for everyone. Just like the example of the two men and the babies in the river, pursuing immediate moral outcomes involve immoral repercussions, and so does pursuing long-term moral outcomes; the question is, which is more important in the grand scheme of things? My personal opinion is that the long-term takes precedence, and I believe that Islam validates this view.
The Dunya is a very rough neighbourhood, and it is comprised of rough people all battling for their interests. If your own life and circumstances are safe and secure and comfortable and easy, it is made possible for you by people who were willing and ruthless and realistic enough to carve it out of impossibility.
Idealism can only rightly be a motivating engine for action, but it cannot be used to steer it. Seeking instant moral gratification too easily becomes futile self-righteousness that achieves no worldly good except your own sense of being good, because solving problems and achieving moral outcomes requires patience, sacrifice, compromise, vision, endurance, realism, and yes, ruthless focus and determination.
We can think about Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, one of the most pious and most fearless men among the Sahabah, but also one of the most problematic, difficult, and divisive. Abu Dharr never held his tongue when he felt something was wrong. Whatever he felt or thought, he said, regardless of the situation or to whom he was speaking. He was a man who had no attachment to the Dunya, and was outstandingly courageous. He announced his conversion to Islam before anyone was publicly doing so — right outside the Ka’abah. He was beaten for it, but he went back the next day and did it again, and again, and every time he was mercilessly beaten. Yet, with all this strength of character and fearlessness, when he asked the Prophet to appoint him in a leadership position, Rasulullah refused and told him that he was weak. Weakness is not a word anyone would use to describe Abu Dharr, but the very same qualities that made him great outside of leadership, were weaknesses in leadership; because leaders cannot be morally impulsive, with no ability to bear what their conscience dislikes for the sake of a greater good. Leaders must have the ability to hold their tongue, to be tactful, to be strategic, to consider all contingencies and do what is necessary for the larger goals it is their job to achieve. Abu Dharr was a man who needed instant moral gratification, he was not a man who knew how to choose his battles, he would battle anyone instantly at the slightest perception of wrong. A leader must have the wisdom to weigh the magnitude of wrongs to identify which are greater and most dangerous, because the complicated reality of the world is that sometimes tolerating one wrong can prevent a worse one from happening. Moral idealists cannot understand or accept this reality, but again, they have the privilege of being spared from having to understand that, because of the hard decisions made by men who do understand it.
And here it is important to remind ourselves that good deeds cancel bad deeds, bad deeds do not cancel good ones. You will meet Allah with every good deed you have ever done, and with only those bad deeds which your good deeds have not been sufficient to negate. Leaders of states operate on a scale far beyond most people — in terms of both their good and bad deeds — and it would be naïve to think that the good they achieve for their people did not come at a cost and did not cause the suffering of some, or even many. They will have wronged and hurt more people by their decisions and their policies than most of us interact with in our lifetimes; but if they also achieve long-term good and benefit to their people, it will also be far beyond anything we do in a lifetime of good deeds; and Allah will count it all. The du’aa of those they have wronged will be heard, but the safety, prosperity, and betterment of the lives they improved will also be seen; and if the wrongs were committed or tolerated as necessary evils on the path to greater long-term good, it seems likely to me that they may be forgiven. I do not know, however, if an idealistic leader who fails to face the realities of the world, and who imagines that his moral purity should be sufficient to defeat his nation’s enemies and that his personal goodness is enough as a political strategy for victory; and because of this, his nation is inevitably subjugated by those practising realpolitik I don’t know if this delusional and negligent approach can be forgiven.
